

XENOPHON: *Hiero the Tyrant and Other Treatises*. Translated by ROBIN WATERFIELD, with introductions and notes by PAUL CARTLEDGE. Penguin Books, London – New York 1997. ISBN 0-14-044682-6. xxxi, 248 pp. GBP 7.99 / USD 13.95.

Waterfield had previously published, together with H. Tredennick, the *Memoirs of Socrates* in 1990 in a volume entitled *Conversations of Socrates* in the same Penguin Classics. Now he presents a new translation of *Hiero, Agesilaus, Hipparchicus, De re equestri, Cynegeticus, and Poroi*. The six treatises are translated from Marchant's Oxford edition from 1920 (he would have had some more recent editions at his disposal, but neglecting them may not have caused any great harm); at the end of the volume the reader is offered some textual notes. Waterfield's translations seem to be – if a non-native speaker of English be permitted to judge – clear and accurate. The volume is opened by Paul Cartledge's succinct and well-written Introduction.

*Heikki Solin*

MELISSA S. LANE: *Method and Politics in Plato's Statesman*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1998. ISBN 0-521-58229-6. 229 pp. GBP 35.

Until quite recently, the interest in Plato's so-called late dialogues has been considerably weaker than in the dialogues considered earlier. In the latter, language, style and drama are often more elaborate, and thus they are more enjoyable to read as well as, sometimes, easier to understand. Even among the less entertaining late dialogues, the *Statesman* has sometimes been judged as exceptionally dull. With the new interest in the philosophical content of the late dialogues, several studies have shown that an assiduous inquiry into this neglected side of Plato has much to offer. Melissa Lane's book on the *Statesman* belongs to this significant new wave of study.

The aim of the author is to give an account of the *Statesman* in which the remarks on methodology are combined with the politics presented. The dialogue is not merely a discourse on the method of dialectic. In Lane's view, Plato is attempting to do something much more challenging. The *Euthydemus* raises the question of what could be the subject matter of political expertise. The *Republic* champions the view that rulers ought to base their rule on a pervasive understanding of the Good. The *Statesman* presses a question: What counts as political knowledge? *How* does the statesman rule? (275a.) The new emphasis is on the political. Does not a good ruler or politician need something more genuinely political and practical than philosophical understanding of the Good?

The answer Lane finds in the dialogue has two sides. Political expertise is partly knowledge of the relation between other forms of knowledge – i.e., the capacity to coordinate the work of different experts – partly knowledge of temporal demands of the right moment of action – i.e., *when* different expertise ought to be performed. With the last demand Plato brings an important dimension to the discussion: that of time.

The first part of the book argues that in the *Statesman* dialectic is complemented by a method of example. The different steps in the method of division seem to rely on the slippery notion of similarity. How to decide which similarities are relevant? This difficulty is displayed by the unsuccessful divisions of different kinds of shepherding in

the beginning of the dialogue. Too much is spoken of the different kinds of objects of shepherding, whereas the factors pertaining to the special features of human objects as well as those internal to the act of rule have been omitted. The right kind of example, *paradeigma*, is offered as something that makes up for this deficiency.

A successful *paradeigma*, like weaving in the dialogue, establishes the axis of similarity that is relevant. An example displays the goal of the inquiry, leading to a division which is provisional and relative to the *telos* targeted. Lane compares this to Kuhn's modern views about science. Kuhn's paradigms are concrete problem solutions which become used as examples for other scientific problem solving. Thus they fix certain similarity and difference relations and teach them as relevant. As Lane points out, Kuhn's paradigms follow one another, sometimes wholly replacing the previous paradigm, whereas Plato's examples should tell us something of the real and natural way of things. They should map reality. Together with the method of division, they should help us in moving from belief to knowledge.

As Lane suggests, this difference need not make the comparison unfruitful. But it is connected to another possibly more problematic difference. Where Kuhn's paradigms are, presumably, generated as working solutions in the daily practice of science, and should thus be suited at least to the proximate areas of research, Plato's philosopher chooses an example radically different from the object of the inquiry. The seemingly different example should, granted, be in relevant ways similar to the object itself. But how to know which will turn out to be relevant similarities? In other words: why exactly was weaving and the divisions conducted within that context a better example for statesmancraft than something else? Because it made evident a division already considered central.

Lane does confront this line of criticism, and it does seem to be the case that by conducting a division in a less complicated context, and by testing different examples before arriving at the right one, something genuinely new surfaces. But to which extent does the example contribute to the quest for relevant divisions? A more thorough answer would have supported the author's confidence in the method as able to "drastically revise ordinary assumptions about similarities and differences in the process of guiding inquiry to a specified end" (p. 97).

The second part of the book is an inquiry into the story of the divine rulers situated in the middle of the dialogue. The story has often been treated as separable from the rest of the dialogue, but Lane shows how it continues the discussion of example, as well as stresses the temporal and changing character of the realm of human action, and the need for political art.

In the third and last part of the book, statecraft is described as a second-order control, a weaving together of arts and citizen factions into a unified whole. Moreover, it is the knowledge of right timing, the knowledge of *kairos*. The politician's knowledge of the Good must be able to deal with the ever-changing flux of the temporal realm, that is, to answer the questions when this or that art or action should be performed. It is also shown how Plato raises the question of political authority and its relation to laws. Laws are necessary tools of authority, but compared to the dynamic rule of a man in possession of the knowledge of *kairos*, laws strictly tied to tradition are often stagnant.

Because of the admirably comprehensive nature of the chosen scope and the

concise and comprehensible format of the book, Lane is forced to tackle several difficult questions, all of which may not get the treatment they deserve. This does not diminish the value of her account of the method of division or the importance of the inquiry in *paradeigma*. The book displays the intricate ways in which method and the topic of the philosophical discussion are intertwined in Plato. Equally significant is the novel picture of the Platonic art of politics which enriches the common view based on the utopian *Republic* and the heterogeneous *Laws*.

Lane's rich reading of the politics of the *Statesman* is accompanied by an acknowledgement of its shortcomings. Plato offers no practical or theoretical suggestions as to how a ruler could actually know in each case which is the right moment, nor, for example, how they could predict the future to a sufficient extent to help in deciding the right kind and time for action. Moreover, although the dialogue moves into the direction of practical questions about political rule, good rule remains, as Lane says, a purely intellectual achievement.

*Pauliina Remes*

*Das Corpus Hermeticum Deutsch* 1-2. Clavis Pansophiae 7,1; 7,2. Frommann – Holzboog, Stuttgart – Bad Cannstatt 1997. ISBN 3-7728-1530-8, 3-7728-1531-6. 665 S. DEM 218, DEM 218.

Dies ist die erste vollständige deutsche Übersetzung (die Übertragung von D. Tiedemann vom Jahre 1781 hat nur Kuriositätswert) des *Corpus Hermeticum*, der zwischen dem 1. Jh. v. Chr. und dem 4. Jh. n. Chr. in Ägypten entstandenen Sammlung gnostischer Schriften, die dem Wundersamsten rechnen, was uns aus der kaiserzeitlichen Literatur erhalten ist. Es war schon an der Zeit, eine deutsche Übersetzung zu produzieren, nachdem solche auf Englisch, Französisch, Holländisch, Spanisch und sogar auf Japanisch während der letzten Jahrzehnte erschienen waren. Merkwürdigerweise wurde nur zwei Jahre nach dem Erscheinen von Holzhausens Übersetzung eine weitere deutsche publiziert: *Das Corpus Hermeticum einschliesslich der Fragmente des Stobaeus*, aus dem griechischen übertragen von K.-G. Eckart, hrsg. von F. Siegert, Münster 1999. (Eine lateinische Übertragung wurde seinerzeit von Cosimo de' Medici veranlasst.)

In den zwei Bänden bietet Jens Holzhausen die Übersetzung aller zur Zeit bekannten Traktate (seine Sammlung umfasst einige Texte, die in der massgeblichen Ausgabe von Nock und Festugière noch fehlen: Fragmente aus Wiener Papyri, Exzerpte aus dem Codex Clarkianus in Oxford und vor allem Schriftstücke aus dem sechsten Kodex von Nag Hammadi). Den einzelnen Traktaten und Exzerpten gehen kurze einleitende Bemerkungen voraus, und zahlreiche Anmerkungen geben Auskunft zur Grammatik und Kritik des Textes, der auf der massgeblichen Edition Nocks basiert. Ein eingehendes Register und eine Bibliographie runden den zweiten Band ab. In einem dritten Band wird Carsten Colpe die literarische und religionsgeschichtliche Problematik näher beleuchten.

Soweit es einem Nicht-Deutschen erlaubt ist, ein Urteil darüber zu fällen, scheint mir die Übersetzung gelungen, gut und dem Urtext gegenüber getreu, doch gleichzeitig